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The author of every elementary treatise, well arranged and executed, confers a gift of no ordinary value upon his professional
brethren, and is entitled to their hearty thanks. Few have the
taste, and fewer still the talent, to mould their studies into such a
form as shall contribute to the benefit of others, and save them from
a laborious search after abstract principles, amidst the cares and
pressure of daily business. The value of the results thus gained,
rises in proportion to the difficulties of the subject investigated,
and to the paucity of those who have preceded the diligent laborer
in the field explored. The volume which heads our list, was the
first attempt to present a connected and comprehensive view of
American Criminal law, and a third edition recently issued shows
the favor with which it has been regarded and the appreciation
which it has received from those for whose benefit it was designed.
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As it has thus stood the test of examination by the practitionef and
the student, it would seem almost superfluous to attract further
attention towards it, or to attempt an analysis of its contents-and
yet, when the second volume under consideration is for the first
time presented to the public, it would appear a proper occasion for
exhibiting the claims of both to professional regard. Whilst the
peculiar branches of jurisprudence which form the contents of
these volumes, are not selected by the great majority of lawyers
as those in which they desire to practice, and the civil rather
than the, criminal courts are more usually chosen for the transaction of business, a knowledge of the criminal department of
the science in its general features, is necessary in correctly
instructing clients in the various matters presented by them for
advice in the usual routine of professional life. A choice of
remedies when either forum is opened for redress, becomes a
matter involving no little responsibility, and by a correct and logical discrimination 'great perplexity may be avoided, whilst the
means to be attained may be reached with more facility than where
the knowledge is confused and uncertain. The conflicts between
the two jurisdictions frequently involve technical rules and nice
shades of distinction, and although the treatise on crimi nal law may
not be needed to assist in the conviction or defence of a malefactor, its
presence is always necessary, and the aid which it affords is by no
means of a trivial character to every one who is engaged in constant
practice.
Under our peculiar political constitutions, the law of this country
bearing upon crimes has been essentially modified from that of
England. Indeed, so great are the variations, that in some respects
it may almost be deemed a system of a different character, except
as to the great leading 6utlines common to both. It has acquired
form under the hands of those who have administered justice amongst
us, during and since our colonial condition, who in departing from
the laws and usages of the, mother country in many important particulars, whilst they have avoided giving immunity to crime, have
greatly modified the rigor and severity of the British common and
statute law, and in many cases extricated them both from the tech-
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nical difficulties in which they were formerly involved. Our, own
State has contributed towards attaining this result, and we notice
that our author, in his preface to the Law of Homicide, has rendered
an appropiiate tribute to the learning and judicial abilities of one,
who possessed (whatever defects he may have had,) a master mind,
and adorned, by eminent, well digested and well arranged learning,
the station he so long occupied. Judge King, the former President
of the Judicial District composed of the now city of Philadelphia,
commended himself to all who practiced before him as an accurate
lawyer, who with great readiness detected the existing impediments
in every controversy he was called upon to determine, and seldom
failed to apply the key which unlocked its difficulties. His eminence in the criminal department of his Court was always conceded,
and his learning and ability have, made a deep impression upon that
branch of the law in our whole country.
The arrangement of both the works under consideration is admirable and lucid. The student is led by easy gradations, from the
consideration of primary and elementary matters to the difficult
and complex questions presented in the various subjects treated.
The doctrines and positions assumed are elaborated with great care,
and fortified by numerous cases which are skillfully inserted into
the text, and also referred to in the notes. The duties devolving
upon those who must necessarily be employed in the detection of
crime, and- in arranging the proofs which are requisite to put the
case fairly before the court and jury, as well for the protection
of the criminal as the furtherance of justice, are accurately stated,
and a general knowledge of their great leading principles on the
part of those whose duty it is, by a close inspection of suspicious
circumstances, to fasten the probability of guilt upon the individual
in whom they seem to meet, would obviate much of the uncertainty
which is sometimes produced in consequence of their omission
through ignorance. We extract from the first volume the mode in
which the author illustrates the application of the system of indicatory tests used by the civil law to our own common law practice.
"In the indications which tend to direct suspicion against a person, there is a distinction between those which are important for
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the information of the prosecuting officer, and those which authorize
him in taking steps for an inquest. The former class, which would
authorize him to make inquiries, to cause a person to be closely
watched, or even examined without a formal charge, comprise those
derived from facts which, without having a particular reference to
the special crime committed, tend to show an inclination to the perpetration of offences such as the one under consideration. While it
is clear such tendencies or inclinations are inadmissible on trial
before a court and jury, it is proper that they should become the
subject of investigation, not only for the purposes of the general
policy of an arrest, but to enable the prosecution, should character
be put in evidence by the defence, properly to rebut it. It will
simplify the search after these indications, for.the officer to inquire:
1st, what facts lead to the supposition that a particular person was
the criminal; 2d, what facts concern the effects of the crime; or,
3d, what facts appear as necessary conditions of the perpetration,
and apply to a particular person. Indications falling under the
first subdivisions are: (1) the particular interest a person has in
the perpetration of the act, by reason of the advantages accruing
to him from the crime, as, where the, accused was the heir at law of
the deceased, and in impoverished circumstances, or where he had
previously secured a will in which he was legatee, or where certain
articles, especially documents, are stolen, which are only valuable
to a particular person ; (2) threats previously uttered of the crime
subsequently committed, or a similar one; (3) preparations made
for the act, by procuring or fitting for use the necessary instruments; by narrow inquiries into circumstances, e. g., the road
-which the deceased was expected to take, the knowledge of which
was indispensable, or greatly auxiliary to the execution of the purpose, by practice in the arts by which the deed must have been
done, or, repeated attempts to imitate handwriting, in cases of
forgery, or repeated practice with fire-arms, or other murderous
weapons, in cases of homicide, or by preparatory arrangements to
commit the crime or to escape detection, as by alluring a person to
a distant place where a murder or robbery could be committed.
" 2d. Among the most significant effects of the crime are : (1)
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marks on the person which may be accounted for by the commission
of, or participation in the crime, as, stains of blood on his clothes,
or wounds given by the victim in self-defence, as, for instance, where
the wounded man says he bit his assailant in the arm, and the arm
is found to have been bitten, and where the prosecutor struck the
robber on the face with a key, and the mark of the wards was afterwards identified there; (2) the possession of the articles known to
have been removed when the act was peipetrated, especially where
their possession is attended with peculiar care or anxiety in hiding
or keeping them, or with uneasiness in the behavior of the possessor, as, for instance, an endeavor to sell the article at any price;
(3) intentional removal or destruction of the trace of the crime at
particular places; (4) anxious inquiries into the crime, and the
judicial measures against the guilty party, or into the suspicious
current; (5) disclosures of circumstances which could be known
only to one acqu'intr 1with the particulars of the crime, especially,
boasts of the comm io.of the deed; (6) attempts to compound
the matter with the injured party, or to remove suspicion, or to
mislead those occupied with the investigation; (7)uneasy deportment, justifying the supposition of a guilty conscience; (8) flight,
to which no proper or reasonable motive can be assigned.
"3. The indications derived from the conditions of the crime are
such as, (1) presence of the accused at the place at the probable
time that the deed was committed; (2) discovery at the locus in quo
of articles known to have belonged to the accused shortly before ;
(3) footsteps leading from the place to the dwelling of the party, and
which correspond in dimensions with his 'shoes; (4) the fact of a
person being found in possession of instruments particularly serviceable in executing the design in question; (5) particular qualifications, experience, skill pre-eminently adapted for the undertaking,
or perfect acquaintance with the localities."
The question of character as bearing upon the accused, whether
offered on his part in vindication or extenuation of the offence
charged, or by the prosecuting officer in a doubtful case, to fasten
the crime more surely upon the prisoner, has to a certain extent,
in the progress of a cause, frequently proved an embarrassing point
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to the practitioner: and this, perhaps, not so much from any iincertainty as to the rules of law upon the subject, as to a current
opinion amongst the unlearned, that in some way or other, it may
be forced into the trial of every prosecution, and used indiscriminately by either- side. Indeed, it is difficult to make a layman
understand why the whole acts of a man's life, particularly those
of a similar nature with which he is charged as a criminal, niay not
be dragged into the contioversy, and made to tell in favor of his
guilt or innocence. Indeed, in this respect the current of the civil
law seems to run with the popular impression, and the general moral
conduct of the alleged offender receives an examination, before a
final conclusion is arrived at under that system. In this respect it
differs entirely from the maxims of the common law, and the difference between them is carefully and accurately exhibited by our
author. We quote here from the work on homicide, although the
same point is accurately treated in the book on criminal law :
"It should be observed, however, that while evidence of distinct
acts of crime is admissible when tending to show special malice to
an individual,. or the scienter, they cannot be received to prove a
tendency to commit the particular class of crimes of which the defendant is accused, and, d fortiori,'is general evidence of such a
tendency inadmissible. Thus, in England, it has been held, that
on the trial of a person charged with an unnatural crime, it was not
evidence to prove that the defendant had admitted that he had a
tendency to such practices; and so on an indictment against an
overseer on a plantation, for the murder of a slave, evidence as to
the prisoner's general habits in punishing other slaves, is not
admissible for the prosecution. It is at this point, indeed, that the
common and the civil law diverge. In the first, the issue is, wliether the defendant was guilty of the particular offence, and he
advances to meet this issue with a presumption of general good
character, which nothing but his own election can defeat. INo
matter what independent crimes he may have been guilty of, or
what infamy he may have incurred, unless he invite the investigation himself neither crime nor infamy can be advanced against-him.
But under the civil law, the issue is not whether the accused com-
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mitted the particular offence, but whether his general guilt is such
as to make his removal from society a general benefit. To this
inquiry, the particular accusation is used merely as an avenue.
Thus, by the common law, as has just been seen, the .court will
check any attempt whatever to show that the defendant's character
and antecedents were such as to exhibit a tendency to the particular
crime ctmrged; while on these points, by the civil law, the public
prosecutor is encouraged to collect as great a mass of details as
possible, and to spread it before the court at the outset. Of this
distinction, a curious illustration is found in a case which has excited
both popular and physiological speculation in Germany. A young
woman, in the streets of Leipsic, one night was assaulted by a man
in a cloak, who darting from behind a dark corner, struck into her
arm, above the elbow, the blade of a small lancet, and having
inflicted a sligb, wound, retreated. He was arrested, and in this
country would har,, b. a tried for an assault and battery, unless he
provoked a widening G th(, issue. But it had been rumored about
a short time previously, that a very remarkable species of monomaniacs had lately made their appearance in Leipsic, called Moedchenschneiders, who were influenced by an uncontrollable propensity to
plunge, skin-deep, into the arms of any young maidens whom they
could meet, a small lancet. This was brought into the issue; and
three questions were presented for investigation, on which a vast
amount of physiological refinement, forensic skill, and judicial
exposition were spent: 1st, did such a propensity exist; 2d, had it
been generally executed; and 3d, was the defendant's moral tone
and past history such as to make it probable that it would exert
over him a control inconsistent with the convenience and the comities of society? These points, after protracted investigations, were
determined against him, and he was convicted and sentenced accordingly.
"A precise counterpart to this, so far as the principle is concerned, occurs in the trial, in London, in 1789, of a man named
Williams, who was possessed with a passion the same as that which
beset the 'IModchen Schneider.' When he was last arrested, he
was met with a series of indictments which charged him with
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assaulting, in the year 1789, a variety of spinsters; it being
averred, by way of description, in each case, that he did ' cut, tear
and deface her silk gown,' and 'did cut, strike and wound her.'
His manner of inflicting the wound -was the same as that described
in the text; but so artful and cautious were his movements that it was
not until the public were enlisted in unferreting him by permanent
advertisements, that he was at last detected. On the first trial he
escaped on account of misdescription in the details; but he was
remanded to wait his trial for the common assault, upon a number
of which he was severally convicted. The narrow issue and brief
evidence eaoh case presented, forms a vivid contrast to the elaborate and metaphysical investigation of the civil law. The prosecutrix was called, proved the assault, was followed by medical evidence of the wound, and such testimony as belonged to the res gestce,
and then in the second and subsequent trials, the chairman said to
the jury, 'you will endeavor, if possible, to forget every thing that
passed even yesterday, and to treat this as a new offence; and to
treat the prisoner, in your judgment upon him, as if you had never
heard of him, but that he was now brought before you, charged
with an assault, proved only by one -witness, but with certain corroborating circumstances.' On the first trial, Buller, J., who never forgot the great guarantees of the common law, was equally emphatic.
' You will totally lay aside every thing you may have heard before
you came into this court, and consider the case coolly and dispassionately on the evidence given.'"
Of the mode in which technical matters are discussed -we present
the following as a good example, upon a point of some nicety.
After stating the proposition, "that an acquittal on an indictment
for the minor offence is generally no bar to a subsequent indictment
for the greater," he proceeds :
"It has been frequently held in this country, that where, on an
indictment for an assault, attempt, or conspiracy, with intent to
commit a felony, it appeared that the felony was actually consummated, it was the duty of the court to charge the jury that
the misdemeanor had merged, and that the defendant must be
acquitted.
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"It used to be supposed, from the casual remarks of old text
writers, that the common law rule was, that whenever a lesser
offence met a greater, the former sank into the latter; and hence,
in a large class of prosecutions, the defendant would succeed in
altogether escaping conviction, by a subtle fiction having no origin
either in common sense or necessity. Conceiving, however, the
principle to be too deeply settled to be overruled, the courts of
Maine, Massachusetts, New York and Pennsylvania, as has been
seen, have held, that where a felony was proved, the defendant was
to be acquitted of the constituent misdemeanor, 'and though the
notion was sturdily resisted elsewhere, it has taken deep and general root. The result has been the accumulation of pleas of autrefois
acquit, in which, through the labyrinth of subtleties thus opened,
the defendant has frequently escaped. But lately, on two solemn
occasions, all the judges of England have agreed that the doctrine,
that a misdemeanor, when a constituent part of a felony merges,
has no footing at common law: that the statutory misdemeanor of
violating a young child did not merge in rape; nor a common law
conspiracy to commit a larceny, in the consummated felony. The
bearing of these cases on the question of autrefoia acquit is thus
stated by Lord Denman, C. J. ' The same act may be part of
several offences: the sane blow may be the subject of inquiry in
consecutive charges of murder and robbery. The acquittal on the
first charge is no bar to a second inquiry, where both are charges
of felony; neither ought it to be when the one charge is of felony
and the other of misdemeanor. If a prosecution for a larceny
should occur after a conviction for a conspiracy, it would be the
duty of the court to apportion the sentence for the felony with
reference to such former conviction.'
"Cases frequently arise where two offences are committed by the
same act, and where an acquittal on the one is interposed on the
prosecution of the other. Where the act is indivisible, as where a
man is at the same time guilty of a riot and of the breaking up of
a religious meeting, or of uttering and of selling forged notes, under
the statute, the acquittal, in one case, is a bar to the other; but
where the act is separable into two distinct branches, as where a
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man at the same time assaults two persons, or stehls a horse
and a saddle together, he may be convicted on separate indictments for each offence. Thus, in Massachusetts, where, to an
indictment for receiving stolen goods which were the property of
A., the defendant pleads in a bar, a former indictment, conviction and judgment for receiving stolen goods, the property of
B., and then alleges that the two parcels were received by him of
the same person, at the same time, and in the same package, and
that the act of receiving them was one and the same, the plea was
held insufficient. But in cases of felony, where one of the offences
is a necessary ingredient or accompaniment of the other, and where
the State has selected and prosecuted it to conviction, it is said there
can be no further prosecution on the other."
The most marked distinction between the criminal law of the
United States and England, is undoubtedly the division which has
been made in most of the States, of the crime of murder into
various degrees. The Pennsylvania Act of 1794, creating these
grades, necessarily led into an accurate examination of the whole
law of homicide, and rendered it incumbent on those charged with
the administration of justice, whilst bound by the humane sentiments which dictated its enactment, on the one hand, not so to narrow its meaning within such limits as should render its provisions
practically abortive, on the other hand, not to widen its interpretation so a'to peril the security which each one reposes in the law,
as the guardian and protector of his person from violence. The
task was one of no ordinary difficulty, but it was well performed,
and the decisions which have been made, as well in our own State
as in others of the Union who have imitated our example in this
particular, have built up a system, which is so well arranged, accurately defined, encumbered with so few technicalities, and so
thoroughly digested that the skillful practitioner finds but little difficulty, after hearing the statement of facts, in determining in which
degree the offence is to be classed. A summary of the distinctions
between these grades of crime is thus given:
"In fine, wherever the deliberate intention is to take life, and
death ensues, it is murder in the first degree; wherever it is to do
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bodily harm or other mischief, and death ensues, it is murder in the
second degree ; while the common law definition of manslaughter
remains unaltered.
"But however clear may be the distinction between the two
degrees, juries not unfrequently make use of murder in the second
degree as a compromise, when they think murder has been committed, bit are unwilling, in consequence of circumstances of mitigation, to expose the defendant to its full penalties. In such cases,
courts are not disposed to disturb verdicts, but permit them to stand,
though technically incorrect. Thus, where S. having conceived and
declared a design to kill P., the parties met afterwards in front of
S.'s own house, and a quarrel ensued, in which S. gave the first
offence; P. proposed a fight; upon which S. retired for a very brief
time into his own house, armed himself with a loaded pistol, which
he concealed in his pocket, and instantly returned so armed to the
scene of quarrel; then '. threw a brick at S., which did not hit
him, but falling short ( him, broke, and a small fragment struck
S.'s child, standing within his own door, who cried out, and S. hearing his child cry out, but without looking to see whether he was hurt
or not, exclaimed, ' He has killed my child and I will kill him,'
advanced towards P., deliberately aimed and fired the pistol at him,
then retreating with his face towards S., and the shot took effect
and killed P. A verdict of murder in the second degree being rendered, the court refused to set it aside.
"There are, however, certain features which, in cases of deliberate homicide, draw forth, generally from the court's instructions
to the jury, that by them a deliberate intent to take life is shown.
Where a man makes use of a weapon likely to take life; where he
declares his intentions to be deadly; where he makes preparations
for the concealing of the body; where, before the death, he lays a
train of circumstances which may be calculated to break the surprise, or baffle the curiosity which would probably be occasioned by
it; where, in any way, evidence arises which shows a harbored design against the life of another ;-such evidence goes a great way
to fix the grade of homicide at murder in the first degree. Thus,
where the defendant struck the deceased violently on the head with

CRIMINAI

LAW-HOMICIDE.

a sharp and heavy axe, it was held murder in the first'degree, -deliberation being shown; and it was said by M'Kean, 0. J., 'Let it
be supposed that a man, without uttering a word, should strike
another on the head with an axe, it must, on every principle by
which we can judge human actions, be deemed a premeditated violence.' Where a man loaded a pistol, took aim at, and shot another,
it was held murder in the first degree. If one man shoot another
through the head with a musket or pistol ball,-if he stab him in a
vital part with a sword or dagger,-if he cleave his scull with an
axe, or the like,-it is almost impossible for a reflecting and intelligent mind to come to any other conclusion than that the perpetrator of such acts of deadly violence intended to kill. Where the
defendant deliberately procured a butcher's knife, and sharpened
it for the avowed purpose of killing the deceased; where he concealed a dirk in his breast, stating, shortly before the attack, that
he knew where the seat of life was; where he thrust a handspike
deeply into the fo'rehead of the deceased; the presumption was
held to exist, that the killing was willful. But it is not necessary,
to warrant a conviction of murder in the first degree, that the
instrument should be such as w.ould necessarily produce death.
Thus, where the weapon of death was a club not so thick as an axehandle, the jury, under the charge of the court, rendered a verdict
of murder in the first degree, it appearing that the blow was induced by a deliberate intention to take life. The same presumption of intention is drawn with still greater strength from the
declared purpose of the defendant. Thus, where the prisoner, a
negro, said he intended 'to lay for the deceased, if he froze, the
next Saturday night,' and'where the homicide took place that night;
where it was said, ' I am determined to kill the man who injured
me;' where the prisoner had declared, the day before the murder,
that he certainly would shoot the deceased; where, in another
case, the language was, II will split down any fellow that is saucy;'
where the prisoner rushed rapidly to the deceased, and aimed at a
vital part; where a grave had been prepared a short time before
the homicide, though the deceased was not ultimately placed in it,
the whole plan of action being changed; in each of these cases
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it was held murder in the first degree. It must be noticed that
premeditation, in the eye of the law, has no defined limits; and if
a design be but the conception of a moment, it is as deliberate, so
far as judicial examination is concerned, as if it were the plan of
years. If the party killing had time to think, and did intend to
kill, for a minute, as well as an hour or a day, it is a deliberate,
willful, and premeditated killing, constituting murder in the first
degree. The evidence by which intent can be proved or inferred
has already been fully considered."
Our author has not failed to treat skillfully another question,
which has been greatly mooted, and in which the -respective rights
of the court and jury, instead of being made to harmonize, have
frequently been suffered to clash. A looseness of practice has to a
certain extent prevailed, in ascertaining whether the jury are, in
criminal cases, judges of the law as well as of the facts, and it has
often been confidently asserted, that both trusts are committed to
their final decision. This impression has gradually been effaced,
and the modern tendency which it is hoped may prevail, has been,
as well in criminal as in civil offences, to limit the rights of the jury
to a decision of the facts of the case, under the direction of the
court as to the law. Says our author:
"Whenever, and as often as the finding of a jury is in point of
law against the charge of the court, a due regard to public justice
requires that the verdict should be set aside. On this principle, it
is true, the doctrine of autrefois acquit grafts an important exception; but this exception arises, not from the doctrine sometimes
that the jury are the judges of law in criminal cases, but from the
fundamental policy of the common law, which forbids a man, when
once acquitted, to be put on a second trial for the same offence.
When a case is on trial, the great weight of authority now is, that
the jury are to receive, as binding on their consciences, the law
laid down by the court; and after a conviction it is hardly doubted
in any quarter that if the verdict be against the law it will be set
aside.
"1Forsome time after the adoption of the federal constitution, a
contrary doctrine, it is true, was generally received. In many of
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the States, the arbitrary temper of the colonial judges, holdingo office
directly from the crown, had made the independence of the jury in
law as well as in fact of much popular importance. Thus John
Adams, in his diary for February 12, 1771, in a passage which is
probably either an extract from or memorandum of a speech before
the colonial legislature, urges that in the then state of things, public policy demanded that not only in criminal but in civil cases
juries should be at liberty to take the law in their own hands. It
is not to be wondered at, therefore, that the early judges both of
the federal and state courts should have continued for some time
to assert a doctrine which, before the Revolution, they had found
so necessary for protection against oppression and persecution. To
this may be added what in another place has been noticed more
fully, that the Federal Supreme Court in particular, which was for
some years so deeply immersed in politics, as to withdraw from its
judicial duties -most of its interest and a large part of its attention,
was unwilling to assert any prerogative which might draw odium
on itself, or expose the new constitution to any additional shock.
Hence it was that Judge Chase not only broadly denied that the
courts had any power to pronounce on the unconstitutionality of
statutes, but over and over again declared that the Supreme Court
was to be treated as possessed only of such powers as the legislature might from time to time impart to it. At the very time that
this eminent butarbitrary judge,--(whose arbitrariness, however,
was much more of the temper than of the understanding, always
impetuous in asserting authority, always backward in assuming
jurisdiction,) was keeping the bar in an uproar by his assaults on
counsel and witnesses, he was prompt in conceding to the jury as
good a right to judge of the law as he had himself. Thus in Fries'
case he said, 'The jury are to decide on the present and in all
criminal cases, both the law and the facts, on their consideration of
the whole case.' 'If, on consideration of the whole matter, law as
well as fact, you are convinced that the prisoner is guilty, &c., you
will find him guilty.' No better illustration of Judge Chase's
character can be found than in the fact, that in the very case where
he thus recognized the power of the jury over the law, he suc
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ceeded, by stopping counsel when they undertook to dispute the
law he laid down, in raising a turmoil, which ended in his own impeachment.
"That Judge Chase was not peculiar in his view, apliears from
the testimony taken during Judge Chase's trial, of 2/1r. Edward
Tilghman, a lawyer not only of great eminence, but of political
sympathies which would have kept him from any ultra democratic
tendencies. ' The court generally hear the counsel at large, on the
law, and they are permitted to address the jury on the law and on
the fact; after which the counsel for the State concludes; the court
then states the evidence to the jury, and their opinion of the law,
but hleaes the decision of both law and fact to the jury.' To the
same efE'ect, also, is Mr. Hays' evidence as to the state of practice
at the time, in Virginia.
"But it was not loner before it was found necessary, if not entirely
to abandon the rule, a least practically to ignore it. If juries have
any moral right to . strue the law, it became essential to know
what was the construction they would adopt; and the most strenuous advocates for the abstract doctrine soon confessed that the
notions of juries even on fundamental questions, varied so much
that it was difficult to report, much more to systematize them.
And yet, if it Were really settled that a jury's view of the law of a
case was authoritative, it was vital to the community to know what
such view was. Take, for instance, the statutory cheats growing
out of the laws abolishing imprisonment for debt. The tendency of
legislation in late years, has been to relieve a debtor from imprisonment in all cases except where a willful false pretence is the
consideration for the debt, or where there has been a subsequent
fraudulent disposal of the acquired property. The tendency of
judicial decision is to construe these exceptions strictly, and to hold
that to entitle a creditor to avail himself of them, he must show
that he had not the opportunity of detecting the false pretences at
the time,-that it related to an alleged existing fact,-or that the
property secreted was actually and fraudulently detached from an
honest and vigilant execution. These views are well known to the
community; they enter into every contract, and are binding with

CRIMINAL LAW-HOMICIDE.

the courts. But what would a jury say ? At one tim6 a false'proraise would be held within the statute, and thus the whole nonimprisonment for debt laws repealed, for the chance of such a thing
happening would be even more fatal to a systematic business dealing, than its certainty. At another time, nothing under a most
flagrant act would be held a false pretence at all. Or take, for
instance, malicious mischief at common law, about which even
among the courts there is already sufficient diversity of opinion.
Certainly with jurors, no settled rule could be had as to what the
offence is, or if there was, no one could undertake to report it, and
its reasons. Or again, when the question whether the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice is enough to convict in a particular
case,-a question in which the judiciary of almost each State holds
a distinct shade of opinion,-where would be the chances of uniformity of adjudication, if juries, acting on the particular circumstances at hand, were to be the arbiters ?"
We cannot make further extracts from the volumes under consideration, without extending our article to an unusual length.
The practitioner who confines himself principally to the civil courts,
will find treated in the book on crivninal law; with great care, those
subjects where b6th tribunals afford remedies, and where, for the
immediate redress of a wrong, or the assertion of a right, a prosecution may be a more efficacious and speedy remedy than the tedious
process of an action. We instance the questions growing out of
the statutes relative to false pretences, and the various decisions
relative to forcible entry and detainer, and malicious mischief, some
knowledge of which is indispensable in the daily routine of business.
We can safely commend both these works into the hands of the
student and practitioner. To the former they will prove text books
of great value, and serve to impress upon the mind a branch of
jurisprudence which is of great utility in the formation of professional character. To the latter they are invaluable as works of
reference, and there are few whose practice is so limited as not from
time to time to render a standard work on criminal practice an indispensable portion of a library.

